Alex Kacelnik  by Kacelnik, Alex
Current Biology Vol 20 No 16
R662Alex Kacelnik
Alejandro (Alex) Kacelnik grew up 
in Buenos Aires, where he studied 
Zoology and made his early research 
steps in comparative neurophysiology 
of amphibians, lizards and rats. 
In 1974 he took a British Council 
Scholarship in Oxford, where he 
completed a doctorate on decision-
making in birds, a subject to which 
he has remained close ever since. 
He spent postdoctoral spells in 
Groningen, Oxford and Cambridge, 
but in 1990 he settled in Oxford, 
where he founded the Behavioural 
Ecology Research Group, which 
he chairs. He also holds Pembroke 
College’s E.P. Abraham Fellowship. 
While his experimental work focuses 
on decision making and tool use 
in birds, his theoretical interests 
cover many other aspects of animal 
behaviour. 
You have interests in ecology, 
psychology, economics… what 
was your prime mover? Bugs. 
“Bichos”, in Spanish. I spent a lot of 
my childhood playing with whatever 
was alive in an urban backyard in 
the midst of Buenos Aires’ concrete 
jungle. My parents were worried 
about the possible waste of what 
they thought was a good intelligence 
that could produce a doctor or a 
lawyer.
Were you unusually inclined 
towards biology? I don’t think so. 
Most children, perhaps all, have 
a natural curiosity about life, and 
towards investigating their world. 
Education, unfortunately, more often 
than not kills it, and I was lucky to 
keep it. In my teens, Buenos Aires 
was swept by psychoanalysis and 
Marxism, two intellectual responses 
to oppression, and I incorporated 
psychology, economics and some 
aspects of materialistic philosophy 
among my favourite musings. 
Tell us about your transition from 
Buenos Aires to Oxford — what 
led to your migration? My early 
research on the neural basis of sexual 
behaviour in toads convinced me that 
lesions and macroscopic stimulations 
Q & A and recordings would not unravel how complex behaviour is generated. I felt 
the urge to move either ‘up’ towards 
whole organisms or ‘down’ towards 
the synapse. Discovering control 
systems theory sent me on the way 
‘up’. I was mesmerized by David 
McFarland’s application of systems 
theory to behaviour. He treated 
behaviour just as physiologists 
treated the regulation of light input by 
the iris or the functioning of stretch 
receptors. He tried to find dynamic 
equations relating sensory inputs to 
behavioural outputs, and integrated 
function and mechanisms in a truly 
original fashion. I immediately aimed 
at spending a year or two with him in 
Oxford. 
From the first day Oxford’s 
intellectual atmosphere suited me 
perfectly. I joined and enjoyed the mix 
of senior and junior scientists arguing 
with passion and logic, without 
falling out personally. Contrasting 
with a dictator-ridden Argentina, 
the experience was exhilarating. In 
Argentina, evolutionary theory was 
not technically banned but effectively 
by-passed, as a result of pressure 
from the church and the military, and 
by the preferences of those teachers 
who accommodated well to the 
regime. My friends and I held study 
groups to read Darwin, Engels and 
Piaget, to escape the stale, censored 
science we were taught officially. In 
Oxford the perspective of Darwinism 
was paramount, and it suited me 
perfectly. I loved it.
What is it that made Darwinian 
thinking so attractive? Its 
disposal of external guidance. As 
Darwin famously summarised at 
the end of The Origin, the beautiful 
complexity of life results from 
forces that are present all the time 
around us. No authority is involved 
in designing living things. To those 
who are not prepared to accept 
explanations involving arbitrary, 
mystical, unobservable entities, 
Darwin’s ideas come as a godsend, 
so to speak. The dictators and the 
churches had, paradoxically, pre-
adapted my generation for rational, 
materialistic thinking. The same 
applies to research on cognition: I 
doggedly aim at explaining behaviour 
and psychology on the basis of 
observable, testable, and if possible 
measurable processes. That doesn’t 
mean that we always succeed!Why didn’t you return to Buenos 
Aires after those initial two years? 
When I was due to go back, Argentina 
suffered the worst coup d’état in 
recent history. Savage repression of 
political and trades-union opposition 
was accompanied by abductions 
and assassinations of intellectuals 
and scientists. A massive brain 
drain followed, and I guess my 
staying in Oxford must be counted 
as a small part of it. But things 
changed after the military defeat in 
the Malvinas–Falklands war, when 
the military lost credibility and soon 
later power. I have always gone back 
frequently and kept my links to the 
country. I am presently collaborating 
with Argentinian colleagues on field 
research on parasitic cowbirds over 
there.
You say that you study animal 
decision-making — is this a 
particular kind of behaviour? The 
concept of decision-making lies in the 
perspective of the observer, rather 
than being a category of behaviour. 
One looks at what organisms do as if 
it were a choice between alternatives. 
A plant decides when to flower, while 
a philosopher or theologian evaluates 
his favourite putative meanings for 
life. Both can be seen as decision 
processes. Of course, methods and 
theories differ widely among realms!
Can you give us an example of 
animal decision-making? Sure. 
Some ten years ago, we examined 
how starlings decide between flying 
and walking. This is a frequent, 
meaningful problem, as while 
foraging, the birds combine walking 
runs with short flights between 
patches and must somehow choose 
which to use when. Flying is fast 
and costly, while walking is slow but 
cheap. We reasoned that a choice 
criterion that conferred energetic 
advantages would be favoured by 
natural selection. Three energetic 
currencies made good candidates: 
gross energy gathered per unit of time 
(ignoring metabolic costs); energy 
gathered per unit of energy spent 
(ignoring time costs); and net energy 
gained per unit of time (combining 
gains with costs in energy and time). 
The latter is more comprehensive, but 
any of the three would make sense. 
We rigged up an experiment 
allowing birds to get equal food items 
by flying or by walking. We then 
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several different values, and titrated 
the required walking up or down 
until the birds showed indifference. 
The predicted indifference differs 
according to each currency, and the 
data proved that they consistently 
used net energy gain. This illustrates a 
general point: behavioural ecologists 
enjoy criticising economists because 
the latter define utility from observed 
behaviour rather than from first 
principles. However, biologists 
propose currencies in relation to 
fitness, but, as we rarely know the 
precise link between measurable 
currencies and fitness, we also adjust 
our adaptive interpretations to the 
results.
Do you mean that the adaptive 
narrative is tautological? Not at 
all! I am simply warning against 
adaptationists’ smugness, and I 
insist that biological evolutionary 
theory and empirical research 
cannot and should not develop 
independently. Life on Earth has 
a history where natural selection 
interacted with randomness, and 
axiomatic reasoning simply does 
not teach us how life works, which 
is what we want to know. We cannot 
do good behavioural science without 
adaptationist theorising, but neither 
can we progress by theorising alone. 
In economics, the same applies 
to game theory: while strategic 
theorising is impossible without it, 
human behaviour often doesn’t match 
game-theoretical predictions, and 
today’s economists have resigned 
themselves to a combination of pure 
theory and facts of life.
Evolutionary psychologists and 
behavioural ecologists argue 
that the mind is organised like a 
Swiss pocketknife, with dedicated 
‘devices’ to accomplish specific 
goals — do starlings have an 
evolved psychological device to 
decide whether to fly or walk? 
That kind of module is not at all 
necessary for either starlings or 
humans. Broad-domain mechanisms 
are easier to evolve and can produce 
appropriate specific outcomes. 
For instance, animals follow 
quasi-universal learning rules: the 
frequency of actions that end well 
increases (they are reinforced) and 
that of actions that produce bad 
outcomes drops (extinguish). What a young starling needs to inherit is 
an adaptive criterion for good and 
bad outcomes (a good outcome 
can be a rapid increase in reserves 
after a bout of foraging). It could 
then home-in on efficient choices 
between flying and walking by the 
same learning process that leads it 
to choose prey types, fly high with 
tail wind, pay attention to the slope 
of the field, or choose shady patches 
in hot days and sunny patches in 
winter. Similarly, a child may learn to 
catch a moving ball by first running 
towards it and then learning that 
converging to its trajectory works 
best. No ‘ball-catching module’ 
needs evolving. Natural selection 
will produce narrowly defined 
mechanisms, but only when learning 
would not work, such as actions 
that are performed a few times in a 
lifetime. Examples are mate choice 
and migration.
Tool use is often seen as proof 
of flexible, advanced, insightful 
intelligence — how does your 
work on tool use relate to your 
‘minimalist’ preferences for 
dealing with the mind? There is a lot 
to unpack in your question. Tool use is 
present in some species but absent in 
the vast majority, so something must 
distinguish the tool users. I don’t think 
that that something is necessarily 
higher intelligence. I see tool use as 
especially revealing about physical 
cognition, rather than as especially 
demanding, and this is why it is such 
an interesting topic. As in the fly–walk 
example, genetic differences may 
lead one species to resort to the use 
of objects more keenly than another, 
leaving to individual development the 
task of perfecting skills. The utmost 
avian tool-user, the New Caledonian 
crow, has a heritable predisposition to 
use tools, but skill improves through 
individual and social learning. We 
don’t know if their pre-programmed 
tool-related motivation is sufficient to 
account for the exceptional tool use 
they display in the wild, but this is 
possible, as under special conditions 
other corvids are also capable of 
spontaneous rudimentary tool use 
and have impressive ability to learn 
and generalise across problems. 
As for insightful… this is very much 
a bone of contention. The concept of 
insight is normally used in relation to 
introspection, to suddenly ‘seeing’ the 
solution to a problem, to experiencing an epiphany, but other meanings 
are also scattered around. Because 
anthropocentric meanings are 
inaccessible to behavioural research 
in non-humans, some colleagues use 
insight as more or less synonymous 
with innovative behaviour. I prefer 
to keep the original meaning, and 
use other terms until we can prove 
that such experiential events  apply 
to members of other species. 
Meanwhile, innovative behaviour can 
be studied without these attributions.
Is there a substantive reason for 
your preference? Yes, there is. I 
fear that in using a stripped-down 
redefinition for such a fundamental 
concept, we may misdirect ourselves 
and others learning about our work. 
People may be led to believe that 
when we refer to insightful behaviour 
we are talking about proven 
phenomena of mental operations 
such as those they normally attribute 
to insight, and this is far from being 
the case. Sometimes semantic 
disputes are worth pursuing, and I 
feel this is one such case.
Finally, what do you see as 
the main unsolved problem in 
behavioural research? It has to be 
the mind. In science there are many 
unsolved problems that we know are 
solvable, but there are others that 
are so difficult that we can’t even 
say that a solution will one day be 
forthcoming. The relation between 
our singular, first person experience 
and our knowledge of behaviour and 
neuroscience belongs in the latter 
category. I think that dismissing the 
problem because of its hardness 
is throwing an interesting baby out 
with the bath water. As George 
Williams advocated, we are making 
progress on what the mind has 
evolved to achieve, on where in the 
brain mental events happen, and on 
what physical events accompany 
mental experiences, but none of 
these provides a ready-made solution 
for whether mental events can be a 
satisfactory causal explanation for 
observable physical processes, or 
vice versa. I hope to see progress 
soon if not in finding the answers, 
at least in finding how to formulate 
answerable questions about the mind.
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